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Reviewed by Nathan B. Oman

aw libraries are generally boring places to outsiders (and to many
insiders). Row upon row of identically bound books containing the arguments oflong-dead judges hardly make the blood boil or e.xcite the imagination of most. Yet Latter-day Saints venturing into the volumes of United
States Supreme Court decisions from the closing decades of the nineteenth
century may well be surprised by what they find. For example, in 1890 the
Court suggested that The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints was
not entitled to constitutional protection because Mormonism was not
really a religion. l In another case, the Court held that states could (and they
did) pass laws denying the vote to any who believed in "the doctrine of
celestial marriage."2 Such cases are the dusty remains of the massive legal
war waged by the federal government against the Church over the practice
of plural marriage.
'When I first read these cases in college, as a Latter-day Saint I had a visceral, tribal reaction. Notwithstanding the passage of time and the change
of practice, 3 I felt betrayed by America and the Constitution. And I was disappointed at the scholarly treatment of the Church's early legal struggles.
Despite the evocative power of these decisions, Mormon historians have
written comparatively little on polygamy and antipolygamy from a legal
perspective. 4 Law, it seems, has remained a relatively neglected field within
Mormon studies. This omission is unfortunate, because the legal history of
the Church is a fascinating story that touches on many of the most fundamental questions in American jurisprudence. In particular, the legal war
waged over polygamy was one of the titanic-and largely unstudiedstruggles of American legal history.
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In The J.'.;Iormon Question, Susan Barringer Gordon tackles this particular story. Currently on the history and law faculties of the University of
Pennsylvania, she specializes in the history of church-state relations in
nineteenth-century America. Although she has published articles related
to Mormon history,5 The lvIormon Question is her first book. It has three
main strengths: it offers a much more nuanced and sympathetic portrayal
of the ideology of antipolygamist activists than one generally finds in Mormon history; it offers insights culled from the vast records of the Utah Territorial courts; and it places the Supreme Court's polygamy cases in their
legal and historical contex1:s.
Mormon writers have often described nineteenth-century antipolygamists in harsh terms, painting them as hypocrites more interested in
scoring cheap political points than in earnestly protecting hearth and home.
B. H. Roberts summed up this view, writing:
Honorable individual exceptions to this arraignment of the anti"Mormon" "crusaders" are cheerfully and gladly conceded; but they are
exceptions. For the rest, the indictment for hypocrisy, sex immorality,
indifference to the purity of the horne, on the part of the" crusaders,"
stands. Their concern about the alleged evils of polygamy was mere pretense. The real cause of this anti-''lvIormon'' crusade was a fight for the
political control of Utah on the part of the "crusaders. "6
Modern Mormon historians may lack Roberts's stridency, but they
often agree in substance with his views. i Gordon, in contrast, argues that
concern with polygamy was actually central to the federal government's
crusade and formed an important part of the "cosmology" of the GOP
politicians who dominated post-Civil War politics.
According to Gordon, the roots of the crusade lie in the sentimental
antipolygamy novels of the 1850S and 1860s. Written by middle-class
women, these novels appealed to a middle-class audience, portraying
polygamy as a barbaric and soul-destroying despotism. Often sensationalistic and having "little basis in fact" (30), the novels served an explicit political function. They were meant to excite their readers to action.
Accordingly, they belong to the same genre as antislavery novels such as
Uncle Tom's Cabin, which were meant to encourage participation in abolitionist politics. In this sense, whatever their limitations as literature or history, the antipolygamy novels were wildly successful, as were the
antislavery novels (32).
The sentimental and reformist calls of the antipolygamy novels combined vvith a Republican ideology dominated by ideas of human progress
and the social preconditions of democracy to form a powerful and coherent
attack on Mormons' peculiar institution. In this "cosmology," it was Progress
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that had brought man to the point where he was fit for self-government.
According to the antipolygamy theorists of the 1860s and 1870S, man had
passed from a primordial sexual promiscuity, to an ancient polygamy, and
finally to modern monogamy. It went without saying, of course, that the
movement was from bad to good, from barbarism to civilization. Thus
polygamy represented a form of sexual regression against the evolutionary
progress of history. However, this was not all. It also rendered its practitioners unfit for the task of self-government. Like slavery, polygamy produced a stagnant despotism inconsistent ,-vith the dynamism of a free and
democratic society. Accordingly, in the minds of antipolygamy activists,
Mormons could not be allowed to govern themselves until they had abandoned their "relic of barbarism" and progressed to the point already
reached by the rest of the country.
Gordon chronicles the increasingly harsh measures that this ideology
justified against Mormons. Beginning in the 1860s, successive Republican
Congresses passed laws punishing polygamy in the territories. The pace
and severity of these laws increased after the Civil War as penalties were
ratcheted up and procedures to facilitate conviction were devised, culminating in a massive wave of prosecutions in the 1880s and the financial and
corporate dismemberment of the Church. Gordon records that during the
territorial period, the federal government prosecuted over two thousand
criminal cases in Utah, and fully 95 percent of these were for sexual
crimes-polygamy, unlawful cohabitation, and fornication. The sheer volume of prosecutions for sexual offenses, she notes, "is, literally, unique in
American legal history" (156). Virtually all of the prosecutions for sex
crimes were tied to plural marriage.
The massive scale of prosecutions resulted from two factors: the success of the Church leaders in evading arrest and the success of Mormon
law-yers in defeating overreaching prosecutoriallegal theories. Initially, federal officials hoped to crush plural marriage by imposing very long sentences on a few prominent leaders such as the First Presidency and the
Quorum of the Twelve. In order to accomplish that aim, prosecutors first
needed to catch the leaders and next persuade the courts to "segregate"
offenses. Because of the difficulty of proving multiple marriage ceremonies, federal officials relied on the offense of unlaviful cohabitation, the
crime of actually living with more than one woman as a wife. Ingenious
prosecutors piled on the punishment by segregating the offense temporally. Thus, Lorenzo Snow was prosecuted for three counts of unlawful
cohabitation-one count for each of three successive years. In theory, the
offenses could be infinitely segregated. For example, one year of plural
marriage could be divided in 365 separate counts of unla"wful cohabitation,
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one count for each day. This allowed prosecutors to pile very large fines and
lon a prison sentences on targeted defendants. In effect, segregation transfor;ed unlawful cohabitation, which was technically only a misdemeanor,
into a major criminal offense. However, the Mormons successfully
stymied the initial federal strategy. First, Mormon leaders went on the
"underground," an elaborate system of safe houses and hiding places that
allowed them to avoid arrest. Second, the Church's lawyers succeeded in
persuading the U.S. Supreme Court to strike down the practice of segregation. 8 The federal prosecutors responded by shifting to a strategy of wider,
but less dramatic, convictions. The result was an all-out effort to prosecute and jail every polygamist that federal marshals could arrest, regardless of prominence.
The Mormons responded by resisting. While most of the fighting
involved "the bloodless tourney oflawyers" (156), Gordon notes that "some
players descended into violence, as in 1885 when Sarah Nelson beat two
deputies with a broomstick as they attempted to serve process on her husband's other wives" (156). Most Mormons, however, resisted through perjury and concealment: many-especially women-were sent to prison for
contempt of court when they refused to answer questions implicating
family members and fellow Saints.
Gordon also documents how this Mormon resistance frustrated
antipolygamists, who responded with harsher legislation. In addition, the
legalization of the antipolygarny movement in the late 1870S and especially
in the 1880s marked a masculinization of the process. While the chief
figures in antipolygamy politics during the 1850S and 1860s had been
female novelists and lecturers, in the 1870S and 1880s these women were
increasingly marginalized, as male legislators, la'wyers, and judges emerged
as the key players. Also, as it became apparent that Latter-day Saint women
were partners in resistance-rather than the imagined passive victims of
domineering and lascivious Mormon patriarchs-sympathy for them
among eastern antipolygamists faded, reinforcing a harsher, more punitive
attitude. Thus, the political support for the Edrnunds-Tucker Act-which
dismembered the institutional Church, confiscating its property-was
generated in part by the fortitude of the Mormon response to federal prosecutions. Yet despite the ultimately self-defeating logic of Mormon resistance, Gordon praises the political and legal sophistication of the
polygamist resisters. Indeed, despite continual legislative defeats from 1882
on, Mormon la'wyers were able to score some notable victories in court and
at the very least forced federal attorneys to fight for each conviction.
Gordon's book shines brightest in its treatment of the cases that
the Church fought all the way to the Supreme Court. Her discussion of

Review of The ",dormon Question

,~,

75

the landmark decision in Reynolds v. United States 9 provides an example of
her analysis. The Reynolds decision, handed down in 1878, is generally
acknowledged as a seminal case because for the first time the Supreme
Court positively interpreted the content of the First Amendment's religion
clauses. The traditional account of Reynolds goes something like this: In the
mid-1870S, Mormon leaders decided to test the constitutional validity of
antipolygamy laws. George Reynolds provided the information necessary
to convict himself, appealed to the Supreme Court, and argued that the law
violated his right to the free exercise of his religion. The Court responded
by ruling that the term "free exercise" in the First Amendment referred
only to religious belief and did not cover religious action.
According to Gordon, this account is overly simplistic and largely
misses the main issues in the case. She argues that Reynolds was not simply
a "test-case" in which the Mormons turned to the courts for protection.
Rather, it was part of a broader political strategy aimed primarily at Congress. President George Q. Cannon, who was Utah's delegate to the House
of Representatives, instigated the suit as part of a "costly strategy ... to turn
to law in the hope of tying up Republicans in the tangles of Supreme Court
doctrine" (149), In fact, prior to Reynolds there had been no polygamy convictions for the simple reason that proving polygamous marriages was
nearly impossible. It was only after the Court's decision that Congress
responded with unlawful cohabitation statutes that allowed, for the first
time, wholesale prosecution of polygamists. Thus, Reynolds was aimed not
at halting federal law enforcement but at providing Cannon with constitutional arguments that he could use with political fence-sitters in Congress.
Ultimately, Cannon's strategy backfired, not only because it cleared the
constitutional road for convictions, but also because it provided the political impetus to pass laws facilitating them.
Gordon also attacks the simple jurisprudential account of the traditional Reynolds story. She notes that Reynolds's attorneys actually directed
most of their attention not to the First Amendment but to the continuing
vitality of the Dred Scott 10 decision.!! In Dred Scott, the Supreme Court overturned the Missouri Compromise (and by implication the Compromise of
1850) and held that the federal government could not forbid slavery in the
territories. Most modern lawyers assume that the Civil War Amendments,
which outlawed slavery and granted constitutional protection to freed slaves,
overturned Dred Scott, eviscerating any precedential value it might have.
However, as Gordon demonstrates, in the years following the Civil War,
many la'wyers assumed that while the Thirteenth Amendment banned
slavery, Dred Scott continued to be good law' to the extent that it limited
the power of the federal government to regulate "domestic" issues in the
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territories. The traditional account of Reynolds thus assumes-rnistakenlythat the federal government had an unquestioned right to legislate for the
territories and that the only issue was whether or not the First Amendment
protected polygamy. In reality, the power of the federal government over
the territories was still an open question in 1878, and notwithstanding the
Court's silent rejection of his arguments, Reynolds had good reasons for
believing that Congress did not have the power to legislate on "domestic"
issues such as marriage.
Gordon also points out that Reynolds presented an argument that was
as much an Establishment Clause argument as a Free Exercise Clause argument. Today, at least in part because of the Reynolds decision, la'wyers tend
to think of the First Amendment's religion clauses as two parts of a single
national law of religion. The Free Exercise Clause protects private religious
conduct from the government, while the Establishment Clause forbids religious activity by the state. Gordon, however, shows that imposing such an
understanding on the Reynolds decision is anachronistic. The Supreme
Court did not apply the religion clauses of the First Amendment to the
states until well into the twentieth century. 12 Even then, the religion clauses
were not applied directly but rather were applied as part of the Supreme
Court's evolving interpretation of the concept of "due process" under the
Fourteenth Amendment. In contrast, during the nineteenth century,
la'wyers conceptualized the religion clauses in terms of jurisdiction. The
First Amendment allocated power over religion by forbidding any federal
action on the issue. Reynolds argued that these limitations protected local
autonomy in matters of faith. Because Mormonism was, in a sense, the
"established" church in Utah, the federal government was forbidden from
intervening \vith it through antipolygamy legislation.
The Court brushed all of these issues aside through a simple move: it
used state law to interpret the federal constitution. Thus, rather than viewing the First Amendment as allocating power over religion to various levels
of government, the Court analogized it to early legislation in Virginia
sponsored by Thomas Jefferson and James Madison. This legislation had
provided for some measure oflocal religious toleration and had weakened
the established Episcopal Church in Virginia. The Court then applied this
analysis to the First Amendment, arguing that it too was a general mandate
of religious toleration. Having created a substantive rather than jurisdictionallaw of religion using the First Amendment, the Court ruled that this
national law provided no protection for the practice of (as opposed to belief
in) plural marriage. "This jurisprudential sleight of hand;' Gordon notes,
"substituted the democratic ex-perience of one jurisdiction-Virginia-for
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a process that would have allowed each jurisdiction to determine for itself
the meaning and scope of the law of religion within its boundaries. This
substitution was profoundly nationalizing" (134).
Gordon also, almost grudgingly, acknowledges that "prejudice against
Mormons and their alternative faith played a role in the decision" (142).
She notes that the Court used racist arguments to support its conclusion,
placing the Mormons outside of its nationally homogenous sphere of protection in part by analogizing them to "the Asiatic and ... African peoples"
(142). Both of these groups, in turn, were identified in the nineteenthcentury white American imagination with sexual immorality and antidemocratic indolence. The Court thus implied that Mormons shared what
one nineteenth-century writer called the "[Negroes'] ungovernable
propensity to miscellaneous sexual indulgence" 13 and the supposed Asiatic predilection for despotism.
On the whole, this is an excellent book. I would have enjoyed a more
detailed, blow-by-blow account of the Raid and more of Gordon's detailed
analysis of judicial decisions. Others may wish that the discussion of
antipolygamy fiction were longer. This tension between the discussion
of legal issues and the discussion of social context, however, is inherent to
contemporary legal history. For many years, Anglo-American legal historians wrote about the law as though it were a self-contained social phenomenon. Their work tended to focus almost exclusively-{)n the development of
legal doctrine, with occasional side notes on the life of the bench and bar. 14
In response to this insularity, modern legal historians have focused on the
ways in which the law reflects and interacts vvith its social context. IS On this
spectrum, Gordon has put more weight on the social side and less on the
legal side.
Reflection on the legal storm recorded by Gordon gives Latter-day
Saint scholars two valuable opportunities. First, the tenacity and commitment of nineteenth-century Mormons, which Gordon details, provides a
powerful reminder of the importance of this period for modern Latter-day
Saints. As Orson Scott Card has written:
Mormons still treasure the myth of persecution: abuse a Mormon
because of his beliefs, and he is almost grateful for the chance to bravely
resist you, for it proves that he is worthy of the sacrifices of his ancestors.
Polygamy named us as a people, and though polygamy is gratefully
behind us now, we still live on the strength of its legacy.16
To her credit, Gordon has the sensitivity to understand this connection
to the past, writing that the "loss of the battle for polygamy was bitter and
still resonates in Mormons' historical scholarship. The authority of the
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Constitution ... reflected the interest of the enemies of Zion" (222).
Thus, despite the oft-repeated identification of Mormonism as the quintessentially "American religion,"17 the relationship of the Saints to the legal
ideology of the United States is ambiguous. It is worth remembering that,
at the supreme moment of confrontation between Mormonism and the
state, the Constitution and its institutions failed the Saints. Ironically, this
failure is something that most American Latter-day Saints, who take an
unabashedly celebratory attitude towards the Constitution, seem to
have forgotten. 18
Second, the ultimate failure of the Constitution to protect Zion from
her attackers gives Latter-day Saints a unique position from which to critically understand the current legal system, even while Mormon scripture
forecloses a complete break with constituted legal authority.19 Mormons
today tend to place almost exclusive emphasis on "being subject to kings,
presidents, rulers, and magistrates, in obeying, honoring, and sustaining
the law" (A of F 12). Gordon's work, however, provides a powerful
reminder that there are other possibilities within Mormon theology and
experience. Confronting the tenacious, powerful, and at times radical
arguments offered by Mormonism's legal defenders in the nineteenth century contains a promise for Latter-day Saints who care about jurisprudence
in the tlventy-first century. Law requires that we work out the limits of collective, government authority and the strength of the claims of faith to
individual and communal self-definition. This constant negotiation and
confrontation betlveen God and Caesar is a central question oflegal theory.
Gordon's book illustrates Mormonism's past ability to provide valuable
perspectives on that question, perspectives that powerfully question the
law's claims to authority. More generally, her work suggests that Mormon thought and experience contain rich opportunities for Latter-day
Saints who have the luxury of thinking about such problems in less
troubled times. 20
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